Abstract

Since the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, various parties have subsequently proposed ideas for a political settlement of this issue. Nevertheless, due to a complex range of interests involved in it and also a lack of trust among the parties having a relevance to the Ukraine issue, so far no big breakthrough has been made toward resolving the crisis. Recently, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, with Ukraine’s counteroffensive taking place, has faced a new round of escalation. Against this context, this article tends to assess how more likely the Ukraine crisis can be settled. It maintains that the U.S. position on the Ukraine issue would matter very significantly in determining how long the crisis could last. Besides that, other series of factors such as the outcome of Ukraine’s counteroffensive would likely affect the positions of relevant parties toward handling the Ukraine issue as well. This article assumes that the Ukraine crisis most likely will be ended with a stand-off between the conflicting parties. Therefore, ending the war at an earlier date and adopting a different approach in managing the Ukraine issue would serve the interest of all parties.

Key words:  Russia-Ukraine War, Counteroffensive, U.S. Position on the Ukraine Crisis, Korean-model, Israeli-Style

Introduction

Since the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, which has lasted for about 17 months already, various parties have subsequently proposed ideas or plans for a political settlement of this issue. At the very early stage of the Ukraine crisis last year, the Turkish side had ever played a very significant mediating role in bringing Russia and Ukraine together to negotiate; and by then the two conflicting parties had manged to make certain progress toward resolving the Ukraine crisis. Yet, due to a series of complex interests involved, the positive momentum achieved was shortly being reversed.¹ Then, in February 2023, China released a position document on the Political Settlement of the Ukraine Crisis.² Following that, China sent a special envoy to Europe to exchange views with the officials from Russia, Ukraine, and the European Union in order to secure an early ceasefire of the Ukraine crisis. Besides that, Brazilian President advised the establishment of a special G20-like group to focus on dealing with the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Furthermore, at the Shangri-la Dialogue held in Singapore on 2-4 June 2023, Indonesian Defense Minister suggested to have the involvement of the UN peacekeeping forces in helping stop the fighting on the battle ground by separating the Russian and Ukrainian forces and setting up a demilitarized zone, in addition to holding new referendums under the sponsorship of the UN in the territories which had voted to re-join Russia.³ Moreover, a group of 7 African leaders respectively from South Africa, Zambia, Comoros, Congo Brazzaville, Egypt, Senegal, and Uganda made a trip to Europe to discuss their joint peace strategy with the conflicting parties on 16-17 June.⁴

In response, Russia and Ukraine had welcomed the initiatives proposed by relevant parties. Nevertheless, due to a range of complex factors involved in the Ukraine crisis, so far no clear breakthrough toward achieving a ceasefire between Russia and Ukraine has been made.

Against the above context, this piece aims to assess what will be the likely development of the Ukraine crisis in the coming steps, and to a larger extent, how more likely the Ukraine crisis can be settled eventually. It will begin by briefly outlining the development of the Russia-Ukraine conflict in recent months on the frontline as well as on the non-battlefield. Then, it will value the positions generally held by the concerned parties on the ongoing Ukraine crisis, as well as the impacts of various positions on the development trend of the Ukraine crisis. Finally, this analysis will tend to foresee most likely in what ways the Ukraine crisis can be settled. 

For access to the full text of this research analysis, please click the link below:

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(Author's note: this research article is an updated version of a shorter piece previously published on the same webpage)